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COMMENT
A RASH DECISION IN SUNNYSLOPE:
CONFUSION LINGERS OVER COLLATERAL
VALUATION
MICHAEL D. MANZO †
INTRODUCTION
Debtors seeking bankruptcy relief under the United States
Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”) file under Chapter 7, 1 Chapter 11, 2
or Chapter 13. 3 In Chapter 7 filings, or “liquidations,” the
debtor’s assets are sold and the proceeds are shared among the
creditors subject to the secured creditors’ preference. Chapter 11
and 13 filings are called “reorganizations” because debtors retain
their assets after negotiating the payment terms with the
secured creditor. In all three filings, the valuation of assets is
crucial because it determines whether and to what extent a loan
will be repaid.
Unfortunately, it is sometimes unclear what constitutes the
proper valuation methodology in reorganizations. Different
valuation methods, such as replacement value and foreclosure
value, are available, but there is no uniformity among the courts
about what value to apply and when. 4 Even when a valuation
method is selected, another problem arises when the debtor and
creditor disagree over how to calculate such valuation and the
amount of interest to be applied to loan repayments. The
†
Associate Managing Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D., 2018, St. John’s
University School of Law.
1
See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 701–84 (2012).
2
See generally id. §§ 1101–74.
3
See generally id. §§ 1301–30.
4
See, e.g., In re Heritage Highgate, 679 F.3d 132 (3rd Cir. 2012) (invoking
Rash to apply the current value of collateral instead of a valuation based on income
capitalization after a future development projection); United Air Lines, Inc. v.
Regional Airports Improvement Corp., 564 F.3d 873, 878 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding
that when a debtor proposes to retain a secured creditor’s collateral under a
cramdown Chapter 11 plan, a bankruptcy court may not value the collateral based
on the debtor’s proposed use if that use would result in a value less than what the
creditor could obtain in foreclosure); In re Winthrop Old Farm Nurseries, 50 F.3d 72,
74–76 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that when a debtor retains collateral under a Chapter
11 plan, § 506(a) dictates that the collateral should be valued according to its “fair
market value” rather than its potentially lower “liquidation value”).
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inclusion of interest itself is uncontroversial because such
payments compensate the creditor for the additional risk that the
debtor may not fulfill a scheduled payment. The proper amount
of interest as well as the valuation methodology, however, are
frequently disputed when a bankruptcy court approves a debtor’s
proposal over a secured creditor’s objections, a situation known
as a “cramdown.” 5 Because the Supreme Court has clarified
neither when a valuation methodology applies nor how to
calculate the appropriate interest rate, cramdown cases remain a
fertile source of confusion over the valuation of a debtor’s assets.
The Supreme Court had an opportunity to mitigate this
confusion in Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash 6 (“Rash”), but
this decision ultimately raised more questions than it answered. 7
Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, sitting en banc, decided In re Sunnyslope Housing
Limited Partnership (“Sunnyslope”). This decision contributed to
the confusion over valuation by holding that the Rash precedent
“command[ed]” that cramdown collateral be valued by the
debtor’s proposed disposition or use of it rather than by the value
the creditor would realize had the asset been sold in foreclosure,
even though this was an atypical case where the latter valuation
exceeded the former. 8
In Sunnyslope, Sunnyslope Housing Limited Partnership
(“Sunnyslope”) developed and operated an apartment complex in
Phoenix, Arizona funded by several secured loans. 9 To secure
financing for the building, the debtor agreed that the property
would be used for affordable housing. 10 When Sunnyslope
defaulted on the loan, the property was resold to First Southern
The sale agreement
National Bank (“First Southern”). 11
stipulated that the property remain subject to the other
“covenants, conditions and restrictions,” such as the affordable

11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(b)(2)(A), 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) (2012).
Assoc. Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 955–956 (1997).
7
See Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004); see generally Mark E.
Beatty, Comment, How Should Property Be Valued in a Cram Down, 49 MERCER L.
REV. 891, 909 (1998).
8
In re Sunnyslope Housing Limited Partnership (Sunnyslope III), 859 F.3d
637, 645 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc); Rash, 520 U.S. at 960.
9
Matter of Sunnyslope Housing Limited Partnership (Sunnyslope I), No. 12CV-00597 (RJH), 2012 WL 12949503 at *1 (D. Ariz. Sept. 18, 2012).
10
Id. at *1–2.
11
Id. at *3.
5
6
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housing restriction, and that they would be extinguished upon
First Southern commenced foreclosure
foreclosure. 12
proceedings, but they were stayed pending completion of
Sunnyslope’s Chapter 11 reorganization. 13 Sunnyslope proposed
a cramdown plan where it would retain the property and treat
First Southern’s debt as secure “to the extent of the value of such
creditor’s interest” in the collateral—the apartment complex—in
accordance with 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1). 14 The parties disagreed on
how to value First Southern’s collateral.
Sunnyslope proposed to continue using the property for
affordable housing after reorganization, and valued it using that
metric. 15 First Southern disagreed, contending that the use
restrictions should be disregarded for valuation purposes. 16 The
difference in value was significant. Without the restrictions, a
receiver obtained a purchase offer of $7.65 million for the
apartment complex. 17 But the bankruptcy court confirmed
Sunnyslope’s reorganization plan and valued the apartment
complex with the use restrictions at $3.9 million. 18
The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s valuation
of the property with the use restrictions in place, 19 but a divided
panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed the bankruptcy court, holding
that the court should have valued the apartment complex
without regard to the affordable housing use restrictions. 20 The
Ninth Circuit vacated the panel’s opinion and granted
Sunnyslope’s petition for rehearing en banc. The en banc court
reversed the three-judge panel, holding that the lower court did
not err in making this determination because United States
Supreme Court precedent “command[ed]” that cramdown
collateral be valued by the debtor’s proposed disposition or use. 21

Sunnyslope III, 859 F.3d at 641.
Id. at 641.
14
Id. at 641–42.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id. at 641.
18
Id. at 646.
19
Sunnyslope I, 2012 WL 12949503 at *11.
20
In re Sunnyslope Housing Limited Partnership (Sunnyslope II), 818 F.3d
937, 949–50 (9th Cir. 2016).
21
Sunnyslope III, 859 F.3d at 645.
12
13
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The Ninth Circuit grounded its holding in Rash. The Rash
Court, according to the Ninth Circuit, held that § 506 of the Code
requires application of the replacement value, rather than the
foreclosure value, when valuing collateral for purposes of a
cramdown. 22 Consequently, because Sunnyslope planned to use
the collateral as an affordable housing complex after
reorganization, the valuation must be based on the proposed use
rather than a hypothetical foreclosure sale. 23 The court also
pointed out that the Rash Court intentionally did not adopt a
rule that values collateral at the higher of its foreclosure or
replacement value. 24 Here, the Ninth Circuit confirmed that
even in the atypical case where the foreclosure value exceeds
replacement value, the latter is still the value to apply under §§
506(a)(1) and 1129(b). 25 The en banc Ninth Circuit also held that
the reorganization plan was fair and equitable, feasible, and that
the bankruptcy court did not err in failing to allow First
Southern, on remand, to make a second election to have its claim
treated as either fully or partially secured under § 1111(b). 26
Dissenting, Judge Alex Kozinski argued that the majority
opinion “fetishizes a selection of the [Supreme] Court’s words at
the expense of its logic.” 27 Even though cramdown valuations are
supposed to limit a secured creditor’s risk, the majority’s
valuation ignored the Court’s expressed desire to reduce the risks
that cramdowns pose for creditors. 28 The dissent would have
held that the appropriate value of the building is without the use
restrictions, which, in this case, is best approximated by
foreclosure value. 29
The Supreme Court recently denied First Southern’s petition
for certiorari in this case, 30 preserving a circuit split between the
Ninth and Fifth Circuits. 31 As a result, the Ninth Circuit’s
flawed reasoning and holding in Sunnyslope stands. This

Assocs. Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 955–56 (1997).
Sunnyslope III, 859 F.3d at 640; see also Rash, 520 U.S. at 963.
24
Sunnyslope III, 859 F.3d at 645; Rash, 520 U.S. at 960, 962.
25
Sunnyslope III, 859 F.3d at 645.
26
Id. at 646–48.
27
Id. at 648 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
28
Id.
29
Id. at 648.
30
See First Southern National Bank v. Sunnyslope Housing, 2018 WL 311350,
at *1 (Jan. 8, 2018) (denial of certiorari).
31
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
22
23
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Comment argues that the Ninth Circuit’s Sunnyslope decision
misconstrued the Rash Court’s holding and is divorced from the
text and structure of the Code. Rash does not provide a brightline rule that answers valuation questions in cramdowns; it
offers a flexible standard that is compatible with the Code’s
protections for both debtors and secured creditors. Further, this
Comment also argues that Sunnyslope could have been answered
not as a valuation issue, but as a lien priority issue. In any
event, the Ninth Circuit completely missed the mark in
interpreting the Supreme Court’s holding in Rash and in
understanding the text and structure of the Code.
I.

COLLATERAL VALUATION IN REORGANIZATIONS

In a Chapter 11 or 13 reorganization, the secured creditor
seeks to recoup the highest possible valuation because its claim
will eventually bifurcate into secured and unsecured claims with
the deficiency—the amount by which the debt exceeds the value
of the collateral—treated as unsecured. 32 Conversely, the debtor
seeks the lowest possible valuation.
By obtaining a low
valuation, the debtor is able to discharge a higher amount of the
debt in question and emerge from the reorganization in a
stronger financial position.
A creditor’s collateral in a
reorganization plan is typically valued at either the asset’s price
realized in foreclosure—the foreclosure value—or the value of its
proposed disposition or use—the replacement value.
A.

Replacement Value of a Debtor’s Collateral

As the name suggests, the replacement value is the cost a
debtor would incur to replace the collateral in question. This
valuation method is grounded in the second sentence of § 506(a):
“Such value shall be determined in light of the purpose of the
valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such
property.” 33 The interpretation of this provision was at issue in
Rash. 34

See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2012).
Id.; see Chris Lenhart, Note, Toward a Midpoint Valuation Standard in
Cram Down: Ointment for the Rash Decision, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1821, 1839–40
(1998).
34
520 U.S. 953, 953 (1997).
32
33
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The Rash Court defined replacement value as the “price a
willing buyer in the debtor’s trade, business, or situation would
pay to obtain like property from a willing seller.” 35 The majority
focused on the “proposed disposition or use” language of § 506(a)
in holding that the replacement value should be considered from
the debtor’s point of view, rather than the creditor’s. 36 This
emphasis was also determinative in In re Trimble, where the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held:
[W]here a debtor intends to retain and use the collateral, the
purpose of the valuation is to determine the amount an
undersecured creditor will be paid for the debtor’s continued
possession[,] . . . not to determine the amount such creditor
would receive if it hypothetically had to repossess and sell the
collateral. 37

The problem with the Rash Court’s adoption of replacement
value is its failure to articulate how to calculate such value. The
bankruptcy courts were left to determine the “best way of
ascertaining replacement value” on a case-by-case basis. 38
Consequently, courts are free to apply the retail value, wholesale
value, or another alternative to value a secured creditor’s
collateral in reorganizations. 39 Proponents argue that because
the debtor intends to retain and use the collateral, replacement
value is the correct valuation methodology since it is the amount
the debtor would be forced to pay to obtain that specific asset. 40
In other words, the secured creditor is compensated for the risk
of an unsuccessful reorganization by receiving any excess that
may result from a successful reorganization. 41
B. Foreclosure Value of a Debtor’s Collateral
The argument that the foreclosure value, rather than the
replacement value, of a secured creditor’s collateral should be
applied in reorganizations is grounded in the first sentence of §
Id. at 960.
Id. at 960–65.
37
50 F.3d 530, 532 (8th Cir. 1995).
38
Rash, 520 U.S. at 965 n.6.
39
Dawn M. Baumholtz, Bankruptcy-Debtor’s Exercise of the Cramdown
Option-Valuation Standard for Collateral in Chapter 13, 36 DUQ. L. REV. 455, 469–
70 (1998).
40
Lenhart, supra note 33, at 1839–40.
41
Id. at 1842. An excess is created when the secured creditor receives more
than it would have under either a Chapter 7 liquidation or state law remedies.
35
36
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506(a). 42 Justice Stevens, dissenting in Rash, argued that the
foreclosure valuation is the proper methodology in cramdowns.
Specifically, the first sentence of § 506(a) shifts the focus from
the debtor’s perspective to the creditor’s perspective. 43
Proponents also rely on the language of § 506(a), specifically the
phrase: “the value of the ‘creditor’s interest in the estate’s
Opponents of the foreclosure
interest’ in the property.” 44
valuation argue that because debtors in cramdowns strive to
retain the collateral in question, this valuation method ignores
the second sentence of § 506(a), rendering the “disposition or use”
language of that section superfluous. 45
Creditors and debtors view foreclosure valuation differently.
Debtors believe that in valuing collateral in the hands of the
debtor, the foreclosure value embodies the “such creditor’s
interest in the estate’s interest in such property” language. 46 To
the secured creditor, however, the foreclosure valuation provides
a windfall to the unsecured creditors by reallocating the spread
between the foreclosure and replacement values to the unsecured
class. 47
II. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S MISINTERPRETATION
Sunnyslope is a Chapter 11 case with an atypical valuation
issue: the foreclosure value of the debtor’s collateral was greater
than its replacement value. However, contrary to the Ninth
Circuit’s holding, Rash does not provide a bright-line rule for the
valuation purposes, even in such an atypical case. The Ninth
Circuit’s reasoning and ultimate holding is also divorced from the
text and structure of the Code. Finally, the facts in Sunnyslope
hint that this case is not about valuation after all, but rather the
priority of liens.

11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2012).
Rash, 520 U.S. at 966 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
44
Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1994)) (emphasis in original). For example,
in United Savings Association of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, the
Court held that collateral should be valued “as if it [were] in the creditor’s hands.”
Lenhart, supra note 33, at 1833.
45
11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2012).
46
Id.
47
Lenhart, supra note 33, at 1835.
42
43
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A Flawed Reading of Rash

The Sunnyslope court incorrectly held that it is
“command[ed]” by the Supreme Court’s holding in Rash. 48 By
“tak[ing] the Supreme Court at its word,” the Ninth Circuit
flouted footnote 6 in the Rash majority opinion, which left
bankruptcy courts with a wide range of discretion in collateral
valuations:
Our [decision] . . . leaves to bankruptcy courts, as triers of fact,
identification of the best way of ascertaining replacement value
on the basis of the evidence presented. Whether replacement
value is the equivalent of retail value, wholesale value, or some
other value will depend on the type of debtor and the nature of
the property. 49

In other words, courts could value collateral at the foreclosure
value even when it exceeds the replacement value. Yet the Ninth
Circuit disregarded this built-in flexibility in favor of a myopic
reading.
The Ninth Circuit also erred by reading Rash to mean that
when the value of the collateral is lower than the foreclosure
value as a result of the debtor’s intended use, the secured
creditor may be given that lesser amount. Rash can be construed
to stand for the proposition that the Code’s cramdown provisions
protect secured creditors when they do not accept a debtor’s plan
of reorganization. 50 In such a case, the creditor receives either
the collateral itself or cash payments equal to the collateral’s
value. When the debtor retains the collateral, as here, the text
instructs that the debtor pay the secured creditor the “value” of
its collateral, “determined in light of . . . the proposed disposition
or use of such property.” 51 As the Rash Court explained, §
506(a)’s instruction to value collateral in light of its “proposed
disposition or use” is designed to protect secured creditors when
the debtor retains the collateral. Thus, the “particular use” of
the retained collateral after reorganization is not dispositive for
valuation purposes, as the Ninth Circuit overlooked. Although
Sunnyslope III, 859 F.3d at 645.
Sunnyslope III, 859 F.3d at 640; Assoc. Com. Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953,
965 n.6 (1997).
50
Brief for Petitioner at 22, First Southern National Bank v. Sunnyslope
Housing Limited Partnership, No. 17-455 (U.S., Sept. 22, 2017) [hereinafter “Brief
for Petitioner”]
51
11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2012).
48
49
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foreclosure value is “typically lower” than replacement value, a
secured creditor’s collateral should not be undervalued in the
atypical case where foreclosure value exceeds the replacement
value. 52 Permitting Sunnyslope to shortchange First Southern in
these circumstances flies in the face of the Code’s protections for
secured creditors.
To read Rash any other way overlooks the fact that applying
a “generally higher” valuation offsets the additional risk imposed
on a secured creditor when the debtor retains the collateral. 53
When a debtor surrenders the collateral, the secured creditor
receives it immediately and is free to sell it, recovering at least
the foreclosure value. Therefore, when the Rash Court adopted
the replacement value standard, it intended to ensure secured
creditors receive at least the foreclosure value in bankruptcy. 54
B. Sunnyslope’s Reasoning is Inconsistent with the Text and
Structure of the Code
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit erred by deeming the price
offered in foreclosure legally irrelevant because nothing in the
text of § 506(a) compels this conclusion. As Rash explained, the
“proposed disposition or use” refers to the debtor’s two options
with respect to the secured creditor’s collateral in a cramdown—
either surrender (“disposition”) or retention (“use”)—rather than
the valuation standard. 55 The proper measure of value in the
retention context, according to Rash, is fair-market value, which
the Court defined as “the price a willing buyer in the debtor’s
trade, business, or situation would pay a willing seller to obtain
property of like age and condition.” 56 The fair-market value of
property is not necessarily governed by the particular use the
debtor proposes. 57 The Ninth Circuit’s justification that “absent
foreclosure, . . . Sunnyslope cannot use the property except as
affordable housing, nor could anyone else,” overlooks the
Had
disadvantageous position this puts the creditor in. 58
Sunnyslope wanted to rent the apartment complex out at a
52
Sunnyslope III, 859 F.3d 637, 649 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting).
53
Rash, 520 U.S. at 958.
54
Rash, 520 U.S. at 959 n.2, 962–63.
55
Id. at 962.
56
Id. at 959 n.2.
57
Id.
58
Sunnyslope III, 859 F.3d at 644.
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higher market rate, it could have consented to the foreclosure
and purchased the property at the foreclosure sale. Sunnyslope
was entitled to forgo that option and decide to operate the
property as an affordable housing complex, but the Code does not
permit Sunnyslope to impose the economic cost of that decision
on First Southern. 59
Section 506(a) also merely instructs courts to value collateral
“in light of” the debtor’s proposal of continued use. 60 The text
provides no instruction to disregard the value of the collateral
that would be realized in foreclosure. In fact, Rash instructs that
courts should not disregard the asset’s higher fair-market value
when retained for continued use, but rather limit the secured
creditor to the asset’s “typically lower” foreclosure value. 61
Therefore, the price for which a buyer agreed to purchase the
asset in a foreclosure sale is categorically relevant.
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit’s holding is not only unhinged
from the text of the Bankruptcy Code, but it also disregards the
Code’s statutory scheme for protecting secured creditors. The
Code contains numerous provisions, including Chapter 11’s
cramdown provision at issue, that protect the right of secured
creditors who have not been paid in full to receive the collateral
or the economic equivalent. 62 Another goal of Chapter 11 is to
avoid foreclosure, but this avoidance should not strip a secured
creditor of its non-bankruptcy entitlement or the ability to
maximize the value of the bankruptcy estate. 63 For example,
clause (ii) of the cramdown provision ensures that the asset will
not be sold for less than its foreclosure value, 64 and clause (iii)
protects secured creditors by ensuring that they receive the
property itself, or a “substitute of the most indubitable
equivalence.” 65 Clause (i) also permits creditors to elect, as First
Southern did, to receive a stream of payments with a present
value equal to “at least the value” of the collateral when the
debtor retains the property. 66
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 50, at 24.
11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2012).
61
Rash, 520 U.S. at 960.
62
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 50, at 25.
63
Id.
64
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) (2012).
65
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) (2012); see In re Murel Holding Corp., 75 F.2d
941, 942 (2nd Cir. 1935).
66
11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii), 1111(b) (2012).
59
60
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“Value” should be construed consistently throughout the
Code—at least the value the secured creditor would realize if it
exercised its right to foreclose. If the debtor could pay less than
foreclosure value under clause (i), as the Ninth Circuit held,
clause (ii) would be superfluous. It is unlikely Congress enacted
clause (ii), which set foreclosure value as the floor on a secured
creditor’s recovery, only to effectively eviscerate those protections
in clause (i) by permitting the debtor to keep the collateral for a
lower-value use and pay less. 67 The only reading consistent with
the Code’s text and statutory scheme is that a secured creditor
cannot be deprived of its right to foreclose and receive “at least
the property,” unless it is paid at least the foreclosure value. 68
C. Lien Priority as the Crux
The Ninth Circuit overlooked that Sunnyslope is not just
about valuation, but also the priority of liens. Sunnyslope owned
the apartment complex subject to secured loans from Capstone
Realty Advisors (first priority), the City of Phoenix (second
priority), and the State of Arizona (third priority). 69 The first
priority loan was guaranteed by the U.S. Department of Housing
Critically, only the
and Urban Development (“HUD”). 70
agreements with the City of Phoenix and State of Arizona
provided that the affordable housing restrictions “run with the
land” but would be terminated upon foreclosure of the lien. 71
When Sunnyslope defaulted, HUD took over the loan and sold it
to First Southern. 72 The sale agreement between HUD and First
Southern expressly subordinated the use restrictions to the lien
of the mortgage. 73 Therefore, that subordination agreement is
enforceable under § 510(a).
Section 510(a) states: “A
subordination agreement is enforceable in a case under this title
to the same extent that such agreement is enforceable under
applicable nonbankruptcy law.” 74

Brief for Petitioner, supra note 50, at 27.
Id. (citing In re Murel Holding Corp., 75 F.2d 941, 942 (2d Cir. 1935)).
69
Id. at 13.
70
Sunnyslope II, 818 F.3d 937, 939 (9th Cir. 2016).
71
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 50, at 13.
72
Sunnyslope I, No. 12-CV-00597 (RJH), 2012 WL 12949503 at *3 (D. Ariz.
Sept. 18, 2012).
73
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 50, at 14.
74
11 U.S.C. § 510(a) (2012).
67
68
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By holding that the valuation must be determined with use
restrictions in place, the Ninth Circuit effectively reversed the
priorities of the liens: the senior lien no longer had priority. This
is impermissible because the Code does not include any command
or exception that permits § 506(a) to supersede § 510(a).
Statutory interpretation is a holistic endeavor, so each provision
should be read by reference to the whole Code. Thus, § 506(a)
and § 510(a) should be interpreted in pari materia and
consistently with one another.
CONCLUSION
Perhaps it is bittersweet that the Supreme Court did not
grant certiorari in Sunnyslope. 75 The Court is notorious for
oversimplying complex bankruptcy issues and handing down
abstruse opinions, begetting further uncertainty. 76 Rash should
be construed as a flexible valuation standard determined on a
case-by-case basis until the Supreme Court instructs otherwise,
rather than a rigid rule that does not account for other provisions
of the bankruptcy code and practical consequences.
For example, the Ninth Circuit’s holding will have negative
consequences for the credit markets if adopted by other Circuits.
Even though this was a real estate transaction, the Ninth
Circuit’s interpretation could apply in any case a debtor seeks to
cramdown a secured creditor. If debtors are free to put a secured
creditor’s collateral to less valuable economic uses and pay the
replacement value, then the risk of creditors accepting less than
the foreclosure value is significantly magnified. 77 Furthermore,

75
First Southern National Bank v. Sunnyslope Housing, 2018 WL 311350
(Jan. 8, 2018) (denial of certiorari).
76
See e.g., Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S.Ct. 973, 983 (2017) (“We
turn to the basic question presented: Can a bankruptcy court approve a structured
dismissal that provides for distributions that do not follow ordinary priority rules
without the affected creditors' consent? Our simple answer to this complicated
question is ‘no.’ ”); Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 503 (2011) (holding that
although the bankruptcy court had the statutory authority to issue a final and
binding decision on a claim based exclusively on a right assured by state law, the
bankruptcy court nonetheless lacked the constitutional authority to do so. This
placed an extreme limitation on the jurisdiction and role of the bankruptcy courts);
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 54, 87
(1982) (holding, behind the backdrop of four separate opinions with varying views on
how the case should be decided, that bankruptcy courts are prohibited from handling
fraud-type claims and related disputes against a third party).
77
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 50, at 29–32.
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adoption of the Ninth Circuit’s decision will also inhibit future
affordable housing projects. A reduction in the amount of capital
available to fund affordable housing projects, and raising the cost
of such capital, will likely result in fewer and less financially
stable projects. The decision will also impact HUD’s ability to
support the housing market. 78 As the three-judge panel noted,
the risk that a buyer like First Southern might receive less than
foreclosure value in bankruptcy will “make it much more difficult
for HUD to sell defaulted loans on the secondary market and
would drastically reduce the amount that HUD could obtain from
reselling those loans.” 79 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court missed
an opportunity to correct the Ninth Circuit’s erroneous reading of
Rash in Sunnyslope. Hopefully, consensus will emerge among
the Circuits and bring clarity to this area of bankruptcy law.

78
79

Id. at 32.
Sunnyslope II, 818 F.3d 937, 949 (9th Cir. 2016).

